Utah v. Clay Lowe : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Utah v. Clay Lowe : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Attorneys for Appellee; Attorney General for State of Utah.
Attorney for Appellant; Shelden R. Carter.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Lowe, No. 20090149 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1529
SHELDENR CARTER (0589) 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 Telephone: 375-9801 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SlUfTOF UTAH 
-oooOooo— 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLAY LOWE, 
Defendant. 
APPELLAN1PBRIEF 
Case20flH149 
--000O000-
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CRIMINAL CONVICTION 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY, ST| 
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK, TRIAL JUDGE. 
f EREDIN iH tFOURin OF UTAH.THE HONORAB; 
PRIORITY NO. 2 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
SHELDEN R CARTER 
3325 NORTH UNIVERSITY 
SUITE 200 
PROVO, UTAH 84604 
SHELDENR CARTER (0589) 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 Telephone: 375-9801 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
-oooOooo— 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLAY LOWE, 
Defendant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case 20090149 
-oooOooo-
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CRIMINAL CONVICTION ENTERED IN THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.THE HONORABLE 
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK, TRIAL JUDGE. 
PRIORITY NO. 2 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
SHELDEN R CARTER 
3325 NORTH UNIVERSITY 
SUITE 200 
PROVO, UTAH 84604 
SHELDEN R CARTER (0589) 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower BIdg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 375-9801 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
-oooOooo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLAY LOWE, 
Appellant/Defendant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPELLATE No. 20090149 
-oooOooo— 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 
STATUTORY & CONSTITUTIONAL 2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS & 
STATUTES 2 
TABLE OF CASES 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 3 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 4 
STATEMENT OF CASE 5 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
DETAILS OF ARGUMENT 10 
CONCLUSION 22 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The language is almost identical and provides as follows: 
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
person or things to be seized. 
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 12; Utah 
Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence. Officers commenced a search of one individual (Lamoreaux) based solely 
on the desire to speak with him about the location of another person sought by 
4 
police. The initial officer then conducted a weapons search of Mr. Lamoreaux 
locating a small knife in his back pocket. Mr. Lowe, appellant, was observing the 
detention of Mr. Lamouriex when a second officer, Provo Policeman Morgan, felt it 
necessary to search Mr. Lowe for weapons. During this search, officer Morgan 
located methamphetamine. 
No cause existed by either officer to suspect any criminal activity of either 
person searched. Defendant argues that citizens are entitled to be free from police 
intervention absent reasonable cause to believe criminal activity is afoot. The trial 
court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The defendant is charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance. The 
date of the offense alleged is February 24,2008. 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. The defendant challenged 
the search of the defendant specifically the search of his person. Defendant alleged 
a violation of her rights as guaranteed by our Constitutions protecting him from 
unreasonable searches and seizure. The trial court ruled found that officer Morgan 
5 
was entitled to search the defendant for weapons absent any suspicion of criminal 
activity. 
FACTUAL STATEMENT 
The defendant was present when one officer (Deputy Sheriff Deke Taylor) 
was attempting to interview another person (Tim Lamoreaux). Suppression Hearing 
(SH) Page 5 Line 19. Deputy Taylor was question Mr. Lamoreaux about the 
whereabouts of a reported fugitive. SH Page 6 Line 6. It all occurred at the 
residence of Mr. Lowe. SH Page 16 Line 16. It was reported that Mr. Lowe had been 
detained by Officer Taylor for an unknown reason. SH Page 17 Line 1. (The State 
of Utah did not call Deputy Taylor but introduced Officer Taylor's report into 
evidence. Appellant will cite this report by the notation Officer Taylor (OT) Report.) 
The Court made findings that Deputy Taylor was lawful in taking Mr. Lamoreaux from 
the home based on officer safety concerns. See Findings, Paragraph 3. 
Deputy Taylor had no suspicion of criminal activity neither of Mr. Lamoreaux 
nor of Mr. Lowe. He simply wanted to interview Mr. Lamoreaux about the location of 
another person (Joe Crocker). OTPage 4 of 6. 
Lamoreaux was inside the home and did not want to speak with Officer 
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Taylor. He refused Officer Taylor's order to come from the house. OT Page 4 of 6. 
Taylor ordered him from the house. OT Page 4 of 6.Officer Taylor then pulled 
Lamoreaux from the home and wrestled him to the ground. Taylor had reported that 
Lamoreaux had placed his hands in his pocket. Although not having Lamoreaux 
detained or under suspicion, Mr. Taylor forcibly withdrew Lamoreaux from within the 
home and took him to the ground and conducted a search of Lamoreux. SH Page 6 
Line 20-24. Mr. Lamoreaux apparently was not suspected of any crimes excepting 
not complying with Mr. Taylor's request. 
As Lamoreaux was taken down to the ground at the drive way of the home of 
Mr. Lowe, a second officer (Provo City Officer Morgan) in company with a third 
officer (Provo City Officer Parker) arrived on the scene. SH Page 6 Line 20-24 
The defendant was not suspected of any criminal activity but was simply 
present at the location of the arrest (driveway of his house). The Provo City officers 
reported the defendant was being detained for an unknown reason. SH Page 7 Line 
15-24. Mr. Lowe He was standing about 4-5 feet away from Lamoreaux and Taylor.. 
SH Page 7 Line 18-19. 
Morgan than decided to physically control Mr. Lowe. SH Page 8 Line 2-3. 
Lowe was controlled by placing him up against a vehicle. SH Page 8 Line 7. The 
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officers (Taylor) searching Mr. Lamoreaux removed a butterfly knife from his 
waistband. SH Page 8 Line. 9-10. See Court findings, paragraph 4. Lowe was 
doing nothing to arouse any suspicion. SH Page 15 Line 3. Mr. Lowe had merely 
present observing. SH Page 15 Line 9. 
Officer Morgan justified the 'Terry' frisk based on Lowe's turn into him.. SH 
Page 8 Line 11. Morgan speculated that since Lamoreaux had a weapon, Lowe 
may have one also. SH Page 8 Line 16-17. Absent any suspicion of any criminality, 
Morgan then did a 'Terry' frisk of Lowe. SH Page 8 Line 19. See Court findings, 
paragraph 4. 
During this search, Morgan located a smaller pill bottle in Mr. Lowe's pant 
I 
pocket and pulled it out. SH Page 9 Line 6-9. Page 11 Line 8. Nothing was unusual 
about the pill bottle, a typical pill bottle. SH Page 11 Line 2-5. It was two inches in 
length and one half inch width. SH Page 11 Line 11-13. Officer Morgan attempted to 
justify the search for the pill bottle by suggesting it may have been a cylinder shaped 
knife although there was no suggestion of a blade. SH Page 12 Line 21. Court 
finding, paragraph 5. 
As he pulled the pill bottle out of the pocket, a clear plastic baggie reportedly 
fell out onto the ground. SH Page 9 Line 7-9. The substance in the baggie tested as 
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methamphetamine. SH Page 9 Line 13. 
The Court made findings after the motion to suppress hearing. The Court 
found the initial detention of both Lamoreaux and Lowe by Officer Taylor was lawful. 
Court's Findings, Paragraph 3. Lowe was not obstructing Officer Taylor's dealings 
with Mr. Lamoreaux. Court's findings, Paragraph 4. However, when Mr. Lowe 
turned into Officer Morgan, Morgan was justified in concluding that Mr. Lowe may 
have a weapon. Court's Findings, Paragraph 4. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The search of Mr. Lowe cannot be supported under a 'reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity' exception to the Fourth Amendment. No such cause 
existed to suspect any crime. Further, a turn into the officer does not justify a 
reasonable suspicion justifying a weapon search. 
DETAILED ARGUMENT 
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The language is almost identical and provides as follows: 
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The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
person or things to be seized. 
The balance between the public interest and the individual Constitution 
guaranteed right, personal security and privacy, tilts in favor of freedom from police 
interference. Brown v. Texas, U.S. 47 (1979). This Court has a responsibility to 
jealously guard the rights of the citizens of this State against a violation of their civil 
liberties. State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002). 
ENTRANCE INTO PRIVATE RESIDENCE 
Here, Officer Taylor detained Lamoreaux based on Lamoreaux's refusal to 
cooperate and to come outside an talk. As a result, Taylor pulled Lamoreaux out of 
the Lowe home wrestling him to the ground. This is prohibited by section 77-7-8, 
Utah Code Annotated. It provides: 
Forcible entry to make arrest — Conditions requiring a warrant. 
(1)(a) Subject to Subsection (2), a peace officer when making an arrest 
may forcibly enter the building in which the person to be arrested is, or in 
which there are reasonable grounds for believing him to be. 
(b) Before making the forcible entry, the officer shall demand 
admission and explain the purpose for which admission is desired. 
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(c) The officer need not give a demand and explanation before making a 
forcible entry under the exceptions in Section 77-7-6 or where there is 
reason to believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed. 
(2) If the building to be entered under Subsection (1) appears to be a 
private residence or the officer knows the building is a private 
residence, and if there is no consent to enter or there are no exigent 
circumstances, the officer shall, before entering the building: 
(a) obtain an arrest or search warrant if the building is the 
residence of the person to be arrested; or 
(b) obtain a search warrant if the building is a residence, but 
not the residence of the person whose arrest is sought. 
No search warrant exists. No consent was obtained. No criminality existed. 
Deputy Taylor should have simply left and obtained whatever judicial approval he 
may. 
LEVEL OF ENCOUNTERS 
Before an officer is entitled to place his hands on the accused, he must have 
constitutionally adequate reasons to do so. Sibron v. New York. 392 U.S. 40,64 
(1968); Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,29 (1968); Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 
(1979). Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143,146 (1972). No justification existed to 
search either Lamoreaux or Mr. Lowe. 
11 
Questions regarding weapons search is governed by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 88 S.Ct 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Lafond. 2003 UT App 101 68 P.3d 
1043. See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999) which codified the Terry" 
standard3d 285. State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002). 
A level one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is consensual -
- wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive questioning by an officer. 
This is not a consensual encounter. 
A level two encounter involves an investigative detention or a detention 
authorized under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A "Terry" search requires 
specific and articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has 
or is committing a crime. State v. Naranio, 2005 Ut App 281,118 P.3d 285. State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616,617 (Utah 1987). The detention should be brief and non-
intrusive. 
Here no suspicion of criminality existed. The encounter was very intrusive 
including physical contact, physical control and in the case of Lamereaux forcing him 
to the ground and starting a physical confrontation. No accusation of any criminal 
conduct is made preceding the search of Lamoreaux or Lowe. 
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See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999). It provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he 
has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in 
the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
In State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,78 P.3d 590, the Supreme Court 
addressed the standards for determining the standard for determining the 
reasonableness of a protective frisk ("Terry frisk") for weapons. The officer there had 
no reason to believe Warren was armed and dangerous but the trial court denied the 
motion to suppress. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. 
There Officer Swensen observed an unidentified male leaning into an open 
passenger door of a parked car n. Warren was in the driver's seat. Swensen turned 
his vehicle around to investigate. Swensen suspected drug activity or prostitution. 
After watching the proceedings for less than a minute, Officer Swensen observed the 
person who was leaning into the passenger door shut the door and leave on foot. 
Swensen pulled Warren's car over for failure to signal. He asked Warren for 
his driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. Finding Warren's 
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license to be invalid because of unpaid reinstatement fees, Swensen decided to 
impound the vehicle and asked Warren to step out of his vehicle to sign the citation. 
After Warren exited the vehicle, Officer Swensen asked him if he had any 
weapons. Warren responded that he did not. Warren did not do anything that 
caused Swenson any concern. Nevertheless, Officer Swensen decided to perform a 
Terry frisk for weapons. He testified that to promote the safety of officers as a matter 
of routine. During the frisk, cocaine fell from underneath Warren's sweatshirt. 
Swensen then placed Warren under arrest. A more thorough search of Warren's 
person incident to his arrest revealed additional controlled substances and drug 
paraphernalia. 
The Court's analysis turned on Terry v. Ohio, where the United States 
Supreme Court held that an officer may perform a protective frisk pursuant to a 
lawful stop when the officer reasonably believes a person is "armed and presently 
dangerous to the officer or others." 392 U.S. 1,24 (1968). But first the officer must 
first have a valid reason for stopping the person, and the officer's subsequent actions 
must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances" justifying the stop. 
Hunches do not justify a search.. To justify a weapons frisk, a police officer 
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with 
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rational inferences warrant such an intrusion. 392 U.S. at 21. The Utah Supreme 
Court found Officer Swensen's suspicion was too attenuated to justify the search 
under the guise of officer safety. Anything less would invite intrusions upon 
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more than inarticulate hunches. 
To justify a Terry frisk, the first condition requires a reasonable suspicion that a 
person presently is engaged in criminal activity must exist. Arizona v. Johnson, 129 
U.S. 781 (2009), State v. Schlosser, 774 P2d. 1132 (Utah 1989.) State v. White. 856 
P.2d 656 (Ct. App. 1993). No suspicion existed. 
The illegal detention of Lamoreaux did not justify a second officer (Morgan) 
conducting a 'weapon search' without reasonable cause to believe Lowe was 
committing a crime. U.S. v. Terry, 391 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. Arizona v. 
Johnson, 129 U.S. 781 (2009). 
SEARCH OF MR. LOWE 
Mr. Lowe's presence at the scene of Officer Taylor's illegal search of 
Lamoreaux does not subject Lowe to search. Witnesses and observes are not 
subject to search.. United States v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87,92 L. Ed. 210,68 
S. Ct. 222 (1948). Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S, 85,91,62 L. Ed. 2d 238,100 S. Ct. 
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338 (1979), reh. denied 444 U.S. 1049 (1980) (patrons at a bar); State v. Baker. 
2008 UT App 115 (April 2008) 182 P.3d 935 (passengers in a car).. 
When officer Taylor makes a forcible detention (without cause) of 
Lamoreaux, this illegality cannot justify the search of Lowe but, in fact, taints the 
search of Lowe.. State v. Johnson. Ariz. App. 2007,170 P.3d 667; Terry v. Ohio. 
391 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. Metzker v. State. 797 P,2d 1219 (Alaska Ct.App. 
1990). United States v. Ward. 488 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 197$). 
Observers or passengers are free to leave a traffic stop and are not subject 
to search. Brendlin v. California. 551 U.S. 249; State v. Baker. 2008 UT App 115 
(April 2008) 182 P.3d 935. In State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d at 764, the Utah Supreme 
Court held running a warrant check on a automobile passenger exceeded the 
appropriate scope of a traffic stop. In Arizona v. Johnson. 129 U.S. 781 (2009), the 
U.S. Supreme Court cautioned that the 'weapons search' exception must be 
preceded by a 'suspicion of criminality' and a 'reasonable belief that the subject is 
armed." 
In State v. Valdez. 2003 UT App 100,68 P.3d 1052, police officer's 
request for a defendant's identification during the arrest of arrestee at her home did 
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not justify a search of another occupant of the home which was not the focus of the 
arrest warrant. 
Individuals cannot be subjected to search based on a third party's crime. 
United States v. Pi Re. 332 U.S. 581, 586-87, 92 L. Ed. 210, 68 S. Ct. 222 (1948). 
Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U S. 85, 91, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238,100 S. Ct. 338 (1979), reh. 
denied 444 U.S. 1049(1980). 
CAUSE TO SUSPECT WEAPONS 
In State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Ct. App. 1993), the Court found that an 
officer must have more than an unparticularized hunch to justify a weapon search. He 
must be able to point to particularized specific and articulable facts, which taken 
together with rational inferences, reasonably warrant a frisk. State v. Warren, supra. 
State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). Here, Officer Morgan justified a 'weapon 
search' by Lowe turning into the officer (away from the confrontation). 
In State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Ct. App. 1993) is particularly instructive 
presenting similar facts. Officers received via dispatch information from an ex-wife 
that the defendant was using cocaine and that he may have been involved in a 
domestic disturbance. The arresting officer and three back up officers responded. 
They confirmed the defendant's presence at a parking lot and noting a man and a 
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woman leaning over in the back seat of a car.. Officers drove up behind the 
Oldsmobile in two marked police cars and one unmarked ponce car. They 
approached the car and asked the parties to step out of the vehicle. They questioned 
the passenger while the arresting officer focused on defendant, instructing him to 
keep his hands in sight, out in front of him and then to place his hands on the back 
portion of the car. The officer then proceeded to frisk defendant for weapons. 
This precaution was taken due to the allegation that the defendant had 
violated his parole and had possibly been involved in a domestic disturbance. The 
officer conceded the defendant gave no indication that he was armed. The officer 
was concerned that defendant's heavy coat could be concealinq weapons so he 
frisked defendant. 
The White court noted the Utah Supreme Court's invalidation of a search 
based on the suspect's "common gestures and movements". No reasonable 
suspicion can be based on furtive gestures and a fidgeting appearance. See State v. 
Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132,1138 (Utah 1989). The Court found the search of White 
was illegal at its inception. The officers were not allowed to conduct a frisk of White. 
The personal observations did not provide a reasonable suspicion of danger, much 
less criminal activity. 
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No justification existed to believe Mr. Lowe was involved in any criminal activity 
nor Mr. Lamoreaux.. Since no information was provided that Mr. Lowe was under any 
criminal suspicion, the exception granted under Terry v. Ohio does not apply. 
OFFICER SAFETY 
Routine pat down searches based on general concerns for officer safety are 
not constitutionally permitted. State v. Warren, supra. The mere possibility that a 
suspect may have a weapon or that evidence might be destroyed is simply not 
enough. State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253. 
In State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996), an officer had pulled behind 
a vehicle and initiated his warning lights. The officer questioned them about what 
they were doing and they advised just talking. He then requested identification from 
each of them. The woman, who owned the car, produced a driver's license and a 
vehicle registration. Chapman did not have any identification but provided his name. 
The officer then ran driver's license and warrants checks on Chapman which came 
back negative. A second officer contacted the first officer. He warned him to be 
careful because Chapman was an alleged gang member and was known to carry a 
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gun. Second officer Ellertson then drove to the scene. Upon his arrival, both officers 
approached the car, asked Chapman to step out, and told him to place his hands on 
his head and lean forward against the car. They then conducted a pat-down search 
and found no weapon. When asked if he was armed, Chapman replied that he was 
not carrying a gun, but later conceded that he did have a gun in a small pack under 
the front seat of the car. 
The State claimed that the secondhand information concerning gang 
membership and possession of a gun supported reasonable suspicion and therefore 
justified Chapman's continued detention. The State conceded that gang affiliation, by 
itself, is no basis for an investigative detention but argued that coupled with 
information about possible possession of a gun, the detention and succeeding 
search were legal. 
The Court disagreed. They found that upon receiving the report that 
Chapman was known to carry a weapon, the officer was entitled to follow ordinary 
safety procedures to protect himself. This would authorize the officer to wait for a 
back-up officer to arrive, asks Chapman to step out of the vehicle, and even 
questioning him about being armed. However, once he was outside of the vehicle 
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and known to be unarmed, the officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicion 
either to continue questioning him regarding weapons or to search for them. 
In State v. Baker, the Court of Appeals concluded an already confiscated 
knives did not justify a frisk of the passengers under the guise of officer safety. 
See also State v. Parke. 2009 Ut App 50, an officer observed a vehicle 
pull out of a gas station parking lot and onto a city street "without stopping and 
checking for traffic." He initiated a traffic stop and pulled the vehicle over in a movie 
theater parking lot. Parke was the only occupant of the vehicle. The officer 
commenced a Terry frisk because Parke made a "shoulder movement". The officer 
also saw what appeared to be defendant reaching towards his waistband area. The 
officer speculated that he may be hiding either drugs or a weapon. 
Based on these facts, he searched Parke's person and "felt what appeared 
. . . to be [a] knife in [Parke's] pocket". Parke confirmed it was a knife. Officer 
Anderson removed from Parke's pocket a pocket knife on a chain, to which a 
capsule was also attached. The officer then extended his search to the vehicle. 
The Court found such behavior insufficient to justify a Terry frisk for weapons. Here 
we have a 180 degree turn into the officer—turning away from Taylor's confrontation 
with Lamoreaux 
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In State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989) the Court noted that 
turning to the left and to the right, appearing fidgety, bending forward, and turning to 
look at the officer, do not, without more, show a reasonable possibility that criminal 
conduct had occurred or was about to occur. 
Applying the logic of Schlosser and Parke, the turn of 180 degrees into the 
office is no more than a hunch or an inchoate suspicion. When it is impossible to 
draw a clear inference regarding the nature of the movement, any interpretation of 
criminality or danger in such a movement by a police officer is iust a "hunch" or 
"inchoate suspicion." State v. Parke, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
1. The officer's search was illegal and the evidence must be suppressed. 
2. Deputy Taylor had conducted an illegal search of Mr. Lamoreaux by 
withdrawing him from a residence and subjecting him to search. This conduct 
should have been preceded by a suspicion of some criminality. It was not. 
3. Defendant Lowe mere presence does not justify a suspicion of any criminality. 
Prior to laying a hand on Lowe, the officer must have reasonable cause. 
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4. The presence of a knife on Lamoreaux did not support that Mr. Lowe was 
armed or a danger to the officer. The turn into the officer by Lowe is consistent 
with innocence behavior. Any interpretation of criminality or danger in turn is 
just a "hunch" or "inchoate suspicion lacking a reasonable basis to search. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL NARRATIVE : 
Name; Taylor R (UC) 
V&le: 19:06:21 03/06/08 
FACTS 
On F e b r u a r y 2 4 , 2008 a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e p . m , P a y s o n P . D . D e t e c t i v e 
B r e t t L l o y d l o c a t e d T i m o t h y Lamoreaux a t a r e s i d e n c e i n P r o v o a t 2 8 4 N 5 0 0 W. 
D e t e c t i v e L l o y d c o n t a c t e d me t o r e s p o n d t o a s s i s t h i m w i t h a n i n t e r v i e w o f 
L a m o r e a u x who i s a known a s s o c i a t e o f t h e n f t i g i t i v e J o e C r o c k e r whom D e t e c t i v e 
L l o y d was a t t e m p t i n g t o l o c a t e t o a r r e e t f o r s e v e r a l o u t s t a n d i n g a r r e s t 
w a r r a n t s h e had o u t on h i m . Lamoreaux w a s l o c a t e d i n a p a r t m e n t t h r e e a t t h e 
a b o v e l o c a t i o n when t h e r e n t e r o f t h a t u n i t , C l a y Lowe, a p p r o a c h e d L l o y d arid I 
i n t h e d r i v e w a y w h i l e we w e r e w a i t i n g f o r u n i f o r m e d P r o v o P . D . o f f i c e r s t o 
r e s p o n d . 
ALTERCATION 
D e t e c t i v e L l o y d and I w e r e d r e s s e d i n p l a i n c l o t h e s a n d when I 
i n i t i a l l y made c o n t a c t w i t h Timothy L a m o r e a u x , Lamoreaux w a s s t a n d i n g i n t h e 
d o o r w a y t o a p a r t m e n t t h r e e „ We b o t h made e y e c o n t a c t w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a n d I 
i d e n t i f i e d m y s e l f a s a d e p u t y s h e r i f f and a s k e d t o s p e a k w i t h hi tn . L a m o r e a u x 
w a s h o l d i n g t w o c e l l p h o n e s i n h i s r i g h t h a n d when I f i r s t o b s e r v e d him axicl h e 
i m m e d i a t e l y p l a c e d h i s l e f t hand i n h i s f r o n t l e f t p a n t s p o c k e t . I o r d e r e d him 
t o k e e p h i s h a n d s where 1 c o u l d s e e them a n d f u r t h e r t o come o u t o f t h e 
b u i l d i n g a n d Lamoreaux r e f u s e d . Lamoreaux c o n t i n u e d t o s t a n d i n t h e d o o r w a y o f 
t h e b u i l d i n g and moved t h e c e l l p h o n e s t o h i s l e f t hand a n d b e g a n t o p u t h i s 
r i g h t hand xxi h i s f r o n t r i g h t p a n t s p o c k e t w h e n I a g a i n o r d e r e d hi tn t o k e e p h i s 
h a n d s i n s i g h t a n d t o e x i t t h e b u i l d i n g . I^amoreaux r e a c h e d i n t o h i s r i g h t 
p a n t 3 p o c k e t and s o I a p p r o a c h e d a n d p h y s i c a l l y p u l l e d h i m o u t o f t h e home b y 
t a J c i n g a h o l d o f h i s s h i r t w i t h my l e f t h a n d a n d f o r c i n g h i m t o t h e g r o u n d w h i l e 
a t h i r d t i m e o r d e r i n g h im t o k e e p h i s h a n d s w h e r e I c o u l d s e e t h e m . 
PAT SEARCHES FOR WEAPONS 
I s e a r c h e d a n d h a n d c u f f e d Tim l iamoreaux a n d w h i l e d o i n g s o , r e c o v e r e d a 
r e d b u t t e r f l y t y p e k n i f e f r o m h i s f r o n t r i g h t p a n t s p o c k e t . The k n i f e w a s r e d 
i n c o l o r a n d had an a p p r o x i m a t e s i x i n c h b l a d e . 
B e c a u s e o f t h e p h y s i c a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n t h e o t h e r two i n d i v i d u a l s p r e s e n t 
a t t h e t i m e w e r e a l s o p a t t e d down f o r w e a p o n s , P r o v o o f f i c e r T r o y Morgan p a t 
s e a r c h e d C l a y Lowe and w h e n h e d i d s o , h e f o u n d a s m a l l p l a s t i c z i p l o c k t y p e 
b a g g y o f w h a t a p p e a r e d t o b e c r y s t a l m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e i n o n e o f Lowe • s p a n t s 
p o c k e t s . 
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